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WHAT FRANK ALLEN TEACHES
Robert A. Burt*
Frank Allen was dean of the University of Michigan Law School
when a junior appointment was offered to me. As dean he spoke for
the school; but Frank symbolized more than that for me, something to
which I aspired as a legal scholar. I could not clearly identify this at
the time, but I knew nonetheless in 1970 when I joined the Michigan
faculty that Frank's presence and his example there were compelling
attractions for me. Two years later I was fortunate enough to enter
into an intensive collaboration with Frank that showed me more
clearly what I had glimpsed before.
The occasion for this collaboration was a request from Judge Horace Gilmore, then on the Wayne County Circuit Court, that Frank
serve as counsel to a man who had purportedly volunteered for experimental psychosurgery after eighteen years' confinement in the state
maximum security mental institution. A taxpayer's suit brought
before Judge Gilmore had challenged the propriety of this apparent
consent and of the experiment generally; Gilmore preliminarily decided that the man, known then only as John Doe, needed independent counsel and turned to Frank. I was lucky that Frank was both
too busy to accept on his own and too intrigued (and responsible) to
decline. Frank asked if I would accept the court's appointment with
him and I grabbed the chance.
Our joint service as attorneys for Louis Smith (for his real name
was ultimately made public, as I will recount) was an engrossing experience for me. Of all the dimensions of that experience, none was
more enriching for me than a seemingly incidental aspect: that for
more than a month, while the trial proceeded to examine the scientific
and social merits of psychosurgery and the adequacy of consent from
any involuntarily committed person, 1 Frank and I commuted between
Ann Arbor and Detroit. Our two hours together each day were a continuous revelatory education for me.
The central lesson I derived from that course can be described by

*

Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University. - Ed.
1. The court ultimately decided that adequately voluntary consent could not be obtained for
experimental psychosurgery from any involuntarily committed person. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 2 Prison Law Rptr. 433 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich. 1973), reprinted
in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902 (1974).
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relating one part of our representation of Louis Smith. Frank and I
divided responsibility for this representation. Immediately after Smith
agreed that we should serve as his attorneys, I researched the constitutional legitimacy of the basis for his confinement. In 1954, when he
was seventeen, Smith had been indicted for murdering a nurse in a
state mental institution in Kalamazoo where he had been civilly committed. He was never brought to trial, however, but was instead
judged to be a "criminal sexual psychopath"; under the state law then
in force, anyone so designated would be indeterminately confined until
"fully recovered" but could never be tried for the originally charged
offense. 2 The legislature repealed this statute in 1968, noting doubts
about its constitutionality under intervening judicial decisions but
resolving nonetheless to retain custody over ~ll those previously adjudicated under the statute. 3 By 1972, when the psychosurgery experiment was presented to Smith by Wayne State University researchers,
he was one of only twenty-four remaining "criminal sexual psychopaths" in state confinement. My research found that recent United
States Supreme Court decisions clearly established the unconstitutionality of the original statute and accordingly of Smith's continued confinement. A three-judge panel of the Wayne County Circuit Court
agreed with my argument and Smith was freed. 4
On the very day of his release, however, the Kalamazoo County
Prosecutor announced his intention to prosecute Smith for the 1954
murder. If the Criminal Sexual Psychopath statute were constitutionally invalid, he reasoned, then its bar to prosecution was also invalid
and Smith could be tried notwithstanding the lapse of nineteen years
and his confinement during this time. A bench warrant was issued for
Smith's arrest; Frank took responsibility for arguing against the warrant and renewed prosecution - and we extended our circuit-riding to
include a trip between Ann Arbor and Kalamazoo. The presiding circuit judge there was, as it happened, the same judge who had civilly
committed Smith eighteen years earlier to the state mental institution
where the murder had occurred. He was not persuaded by Frank's
argument that the renewed prosecution offended both norms of fundamental fairness, which would require that the state honor its original
promise to Smith, and more specific guarantees of the right to a speedy
trial.
2. MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 780.507-08 (1948) (repealed 1968).
3. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 330.35b (1970); MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, IN·
TERIM REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO THE 1967 SPECIAL SESSION, 5 MICH. HOUSE J.
115, 119-20 (1967).
4. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. HC73-19434AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne
County, Mich. Mar. 23, 1973) (unreported).
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We then proceeded to the state intermediate court of appeals.
Frank wrote the brief, which was marked by the same clarity, the
same taut reasoning, the same eloquence as all of his more widely circulated work. Here are two passages from it:
The position of the prosecutor is supported neither by good morals,
good logic, nor good sense. In this procedure the State of Michigan is
seeking to take advantage of the invalidity of its own statute in order to
evade its specific undertaking to bar criminal prosecution of appellant,
and to proceed on the wholly fictional basis that nothing has happened
by reason of the [Criminal Sexual Psychopath] law in this case. Nor can
this unattractive posture be justified by appeals to the public interest.
The facts charged in the information allegedly occurred almost a generation ago. The prosecution has made no effort to show that appellant is
today a danger to the community, nor has any public official invoked the
procedures of civil commitment against appellant whereby a determination of present danger could be made. In any event, the civil commitment procedures continue to be available should evidences of danger by
reason of mental disorder appear. 5
Here the prosecut[or] proposes to reinstate a prosecution after one of
the longest periods of delay in the American judicial literature on the
right to speedy trial. The attorney for the state seeks to excuse this delay
because of a constitutional deficiency in a statute of the state he is representing.... Appellant has sustained over eighteen years of incarceration
under some of the most rigorous institutional conditions to be found in
this state. He is now asked to defend himself against criminal charges
for acts allegedly committed by him nearly a generation ago when he
was an adolescent confined in a state mental hospital and suffering from
serious mental disorder. If these facts do not make out a case for enforcing the right to speedy trial, one may wonder what its purpose and utility
is. 6

The Kalamazoo Prosecutor's office was stung by this brief, perhaps
because of the severity of its criticism, perhaps also because this criticism came from a former dean of the University of Michigan Law
School. Whatever the reasons, their underlying resentment was apparent from an unusual letter that the chief of the appellate division in
the prosecutor's office, Stephen M. Wheeler, sent to Frank. Wheeler
stated that he was "greatly dismayed at the language and implications" of Frank's brief. "When we assumed the positions of Prosecutor
and Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, we left neither our morals, logic,
or good sense behind." This was the core of his complaint:
As I review the briefs of lawyers fresh out of law school, and your
brief, I have come to the conclusion that one aspect of the law not taught
in law school classes is the proper decorum and respect between attar5. Brief on Appeal for Defendant-Appellant at 12, People v. Smith, 57 Mich. App. 556, 226
N.W.2d 673 (1975) (footnote omitted} [hereinafter Briet].
6. Id. at 24.
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neys. One of the basic tenants of professionalizm is that while the advocate does his absolute best to represent the cause of his client, he does
not do so by attacking the integrity or morality of the attorney representing the opposite party.'

Wheeler thus rested his grievance against Frank on the premise
that an attorney's personal morality cannot properly be judged by the
position he advances on his client's behalf. I would not say that Frank
wholly rejected this premise. It plays an important and proper part in
establishing that attorneys may, and often must, zealously represent
clients whose actions or views are morally abhorrent to them: thus
Frank could represent a man who might have brutally murdered a
nurse. But I would say, based on my extensive course with Frank,
that he was uncomfortable with the premise and that his discomfort
arose not so much from abstract ratiocination as from the depths of
his character. The premise that an attorney is not personally responsible for the position he advances for his client can imply a kind of
moral relativism that is antithetical to Frank's nature - as if the best
or even the only route to truth were unconstrained advocacy of any
imaginable position in the courtroom or the "marketplace of ideas" in
the same way that social welfare is supposedly achieved "invisibly" in
an Adam Smithian market by everyone acting on the premise of unrestrained selfish aggrandizement.
Frank was simply incapable - characterologically incapable - of
this kind of blinkered, self-referent conduct. The idea that he could be
exonerated from personal responsibility for advocacy on a client's behalf could therefore not sit comfortably with Frank. He saw too
clearly the comfortable self-deceptions made possible by this kind of
moral detachment. This danger was indeed epitomized by the position
of the Kalamazoo prosecutors in Louis Smith's case. Whatever the
merits of the distinction between attorney and client in the private
practice of law, that distinction has much more attenuated relevance
in public representation. The Kalamazoo prosecutors could maintain
that their personal integrity and morality were irrelevant to their decision to renew Smith's prosecution only by imagining that there was "a
client" somewhere - a mythical embodiment of John Q. Public who directed this action and thereby exempted the prosecutors as
merely obedient instruments of the Public Will.
The prosecutors may indeed have deluded themselves into this belief; if so, their lack of integrity, their inability to understand and ac7. Letter from Stephen M. Wheeler, Chief of Appellate Division, Office of the Prosecuting
Attorney, Kalamazoo County, Michigan, to Francis A. Allen (Jan. 29, 1974) (copy on file at
Michigan Law Review).
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cept personal responsibility for their own actions, was subject even to
harsher criticism than Frank aimed at them in his brief. I must say,
however, that it is difficult to imagine a more stringent criticism than
Frank directed midway in his brief, in explaining why the prosecutor's
delay could not be excused by his erroneous reliance on the constitutional validity of the original committing statute: "It is the decision to
revive the prosecution, not the long suspension of the proceedings,
that shocks the conscience in this case. . . . The prosecutor is not a
private litigant and may not be permitted to take advantage of the
statute's deficiency ...."s
The striking characteristic of Frank's brief in this case was precisely what stung the Kalamazoo prosecutors: his willingness to make
explicit moral judgments.9 What I learned from Frank in the course
of our collaboration - or, more precisely, what I learned about him,
because this was a lesson that he did not so much teach as exemplify
- was his basis for this willingness. Frank's moral analysis arose
from his character. Not intelligence or ratiocinating rigor - though
Frank has these qualities in abundance. Not mastery of formal social
science disciplines like psychiatry or economics - though Frank has
clear command of the proper, and properly limited, uses of such disciplines for legal scholarship. Law is fundamentally about public morality. The capacity to reach judgment on such questions cannot depend
on intelligence or formal analytic training alone. More is required. To
say that Frank exemplifies this, and that his warrant for moral judgment resides in his character, is to acknowledge my own inability to
define this essential capacity or to explain how it can be taught or
learned except in the personal examples afforded by, great and gifted
teachers.
8. Brief, supra note 5, at 19.
9. The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately, though belatedly, concurred in Frank's judgments. After the court of appeals rejected his position, People v. Smith, 57 Mich. App. 556, 226
N.W.2d 673 (1975), the supreme court initially equivocated; by a four-to-three vote, the court
ruled that the trial should proceed and that the objections raised in Frank's brief could be considered on an appeal from any conviction. 396 Mich. 955 (1976). Frank and I then relinquished
our representational responsibilities to Richard Ryan Lamb, a Kalamazoo attorney. In 1976,
Smith was convicted of having committed first-degree murder (in 1954) and sentenced to life
imprisonment. Three years later, the Michigan Supreme Court unanimously reversed Smith's
conviction. The court observed:
[T]he prosecutor relies upon the legal fiction that since the act was a nullity from its
inception, the state's assurance to Smith that he would never be tried or sentenced is like-.
wise a nullity. Thus the solemn promise of the sovereign is broken in the name of constitutional construction.
We think that comports neither with traditional notions of fundamental fairness in the
classic constitutional sense, nor the more elemental and compelling principles of fundamental human justice rooted in the natural law.
People v. Smith, 405 Mich. 418, 435, 275 N.W.2d 466, 471-72 (1979).
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In one small way, however, Frank's work on this brief gave me a
heartening lesson. Before this enterprise, I had only seen Frank's
work in published or near-published form. While writing this brief,
Frank showed me his earliest drafts direct from his typewriter. I was
astounded that there were more than a few infelicities of expression,
even some grammatical errors that I was able to detect in these drafts.
When I confronted Frank with several egregiously split infinitives, he
was surprised at my surprise. I had imagined because Frank's expressive eloquence flowed so beautifully on the published page that it came
easily and quickly to him. I was mistaken. Frank's clarity and grace
was an achievement for him; he worked hard at it. The intensity of
this effort, the rigor of his self-criticism, were themselves a revelation
to me. It gave me some hope that not only Frank's style but his content were more than a natural gift. If this were true, then others had
some hope, by emulating his intense self-scrutinizing efforts, of reaching toward if not ultimately attaining his accomplishments.
As Frank Allen leaves the University of Michigan Law School to
continue his teaching elsewhere, I would borrow an observation that
Oliver Wendell Holmes made regarding Louis Brandeis: "Whenever
he left my house I was likely to say to my wife, 'There goes a really
good man.' " 10
10. Holmes, Introduction to MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS at ix (F. Frankfurter ed. 1932).

